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Abstract 
Mergers and Acquisitions are considered as an important part of the world of corporate 
finance. Over the years they have evolved from horizontal mergers to mega conglomerates. 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, which today represent a major segment of the 
mergers and acquisitions, first came into play in 1990s. Since then they have gained 
popularity and the total volume and number of cross-border deals worldwide have 
increased. Unfortunately, the academic literature on cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
is not at pace with their growing popularity. Most of the early studies on cross-border 
M&A, either treated it as a form of FDI or studied it together with domestic mergers and 
acquisitions and not as an individual study. However recent studies started focusing on 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions as an individual study and focused on the causes and 
factors that affect cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  
Our study belongs to this growing literature exploring the determinants of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. Several of the studies on cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
were highly concentrated on US and UK markets. Therefore, in our thesis we will be 
focusing on Nordic acquirers. We study cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals done 
by Nordic acquirers for a period of twelve years – 2003 to 2014 to understand the pattern 
and determinants of cross-border activity in the Nordic countries. 
 
Keywords: Cross-border M&A, Mergers and Acquisitions, Determinants, Nordic 
countries.
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Abstract (Portuguese Version)  
Fusões e aquisições são consideradas como uma parte importante do mundo das 
finanças corporativas. Ao longo dos anos, estas operações evoluíram a partir de 
concentrações horizontais para mega-conglomerados. As fusões e aquisições 
transfronteiriças, que hoje representam um importante segmento das fusões e aquisições, 
vieram pela primeira vez em jogo na década de 1990. Desde então, estas ganharam 
popularidade e o volume total e número de negócios transfronteiriços em todo o mundo têm 
aumentado. Infelizmente, a literatura acadêmica sobre as fusões e aquisições 
transfronteiriças não tem acompanhado a sua crescente popularidade. A maioria dos 
primeiros estudos sobre fusões e aquisições transfronteiriças tratavam estas como uma 
forma de IDE-Investimento Direto Estrangeiro ou estudavam-nas juntamente com fusões e 
aquisições no mercado interno e não de uma forma individualizada. No entanto, estudos 
recentes começaram a concentrar-se em fusões e aquisições transfronteiras como um estudo 
individual, incidindo sobre as causas e os fatores que afetam essas operações. 
O nosso estudo pertence a esta literatura crescente que explora os determinantes das 
fusões e aquisições transfronteiriças. Vários dos estudos sobre estas operações foram 
altamente concentrados nos mercados americanos e do Reino Unido. Desta forma, neste 
trabalho o nosso enfoque é nos adquirentes nórdicos. Estudamos assim as fusões e 
aquisições transfronteiriças concretizadas pelos adquirentes nórdicos por um período de 
doze anos - 2003 a 2014 de forma a poder entender o padrão e os determinantes da 
atividade transfronteiriça de fusões e aquisições nos países nórdicos. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 The complex phenomenon that mergers and acquisitions represent has attracted 
substantial interest from a variety of management disciplines over the past 30 years 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). Mergers and Acquisitions (henceforth referred to as 
M&A) form a large part of the ever changing world of corporate finance. M&As have long 
been a popular strategy for firms and represent an important alternative for strategic 
expansion. The popularity of this strategy increased tremendously in the decade of the 
1990s (Shimizu et al. 2004). It has evolved over the years and the number of total M&As 
worldwide has been increasing rapidly. M&As started out as small horizontal mergers, 
where two or more companies operating in the same market would come  together to cut 
costs and reap the benefits of economies of scale to megadeals at international level to seek 
new technology, reach new markets, maximize profits, minimize risks, etc. A look back at 
the history of M&As would help us better understand the how it has evolved over the years. 
 Mergers and Acquisitions are two different terms that are often used 
interchangeably in spite of the fact that they represent two different aspects. A merger 
occurs when two or more companies agree to merge into a new single company in order to 
share resources and reap the benefits of synergies (OECD, 2008). An acquisition on the 
other hand is the purchase of existing shares issued by another firm in order to take control 
of the target firm or increase ownership. There are two types of acquisitions: take over, 
where the acquirer is larger than the target, and reverse take-over, where the target firm is 
larger than the acquirer (OECD 2008).  
The first wave of mergers and acquisitions began in twentieth century with the next 
two waves occurring in 1920s and 1960s. After a short pause, the mergers and acquisitions 
were back on track with fourth merger wave in the 1980s. Figure 1 shows the value and 
volume of M&A deals from mid 1980s when the economy was in the middle of the fourth 
merger wave – also known as the takeover wave. In the U.S economic history it was unique 
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and one of the most intense mergers and acquisitions period. Compared to prior historical 
periods, the volume of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s was exceptional. Besides the 
boost in the volume of mergers and acquisitions, there was also a steady increase in the 
average price of each acquisition. Hostile takeovers and corporate raiders were prominent 
during this phase. Corporate raiders used junk bond market as a tool to obtain access to 
millions of dollars to target some of the largest and well established corporations. The 
period also saw a rapid growth of Leverage buyouts. Another prominent feature of this 
period was a significant percent of takeovers which included foreign bidders although 
nothing compared to what was to come in the fifth merger wave. 
The fourth merger wave came to an end towards the beginning of 1990s with a 
recession in tow. The economic slowdown, and the fall of junk bond market, which 
provided financing for the LBOs during the period, can be considered as the reasons behind 
the fall of the fourth merger wave.  After a relatively short recession, in 1993 the economy 
picked up speed and by 1994 we were headlong into the next full-scale merger wave.  
Figure 1: Mergers and Acquisitions – Value and number of deals Worldwide 
 
Source: Institute of Mergers and Acquisitions and Alliances (https://imaa-
institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions/) 
The fifth merger wave featured an unprecedented volume of M&As and surpassed 
the deals values of the 1980s. According to Hitt et al., (2001 a, b) the value of acquisitions 
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completed in 1997 were more than the value of all acquisitions completed in 1980s. The 
prior merger periods were mainly restricted to the United States but the 1990s wave was 
however a truly international phenomenon. Not only was there a heighted volume of M&As 
in Europe but also a spike in volume of deals in Asia. This period featured corporate 
managers preferring long term and strategic deals to the short-term, financially driven deals 
of the fourth wave. Other features include affinity towards consolidation deals, 
privatization of state owned enterprises which increased the number of potential bidders 
and targets and emerging market acquirers.  
The record-setting fifth merger wave came to an end with bursting of the 
‘Millennium Bubble’, which resulted in an overall slowdown in economy and recession in 
the US and other countries in 2000. The period saw many megamergers and a dramatic 
increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
About three years after the end of the fifth merger wave the sixth merger wave 
emerged in 2003. From a low of $1.2 trillion in 2002 the pace of merger activity has 
increased to $3.4 trillion, which is more than double, by the end of 2006
1
. The sixth wave 
came to an end in late 2007. According to Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, and Travlos (2012) the 
drivers of this wave is primarily the availability of abundant liquidity. Moreover acquirers 
were less overvalued than the targets.  
  The trend of cross-border mergers and acquisitions can be explained as a situation 
where a company from one country is merged with a company from another country or 
acquired by a company from another country. Assets and liabilities of the companies from 
two different countries are combined into a new legal entity in case of a cross border 
merger on the other hand there is a transfer of assets and liabilities from target to acquirer 
in case of cross border acquisition (Chen and Findlay 2003). Technological growth and 
globalization of businesses have hugely effected the expansion and contributed to the 
popularity of cross border M&As (M. Hitt et al. 1998; M. A. Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie 
1998). The first incident of cross-border M&A occurred in 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, 
the number of cross-border acquisitions occurring each year had more than tripled 
(Morosini, Shane, and Singh 1998) and in 1999 and 2000 40% of the deals completed were 
                                                 
1
 See “Merger Waves in 19th,20th and 21st Centuries” by Lipton M. (2006) 
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cross border (Hitt et al., 2001 a, b). Until the 1999 the cross-border market within the 
European nations was dominated by UK, French and German firms. However, Spanish, 
Dutch, Swiss and Nordic firms, gained momentum by exploiting the start of the 
globalization. The advent of globalization made the market for cross-border M&A a truly 
global place with acquirers and targets from all over the world. 
 From 1995 - 2004 technological industries were the most dynamic buyers and 
sellers, but from 2000, the financial sector began to dominate the cross-border take-over 
market. Technological industries were no longer the primary acquirers but continued to be 
top targets. In 2004, the volume of cross-border M&As rose by 28% amidst an overall 
expansion of total M&As by nearly 50% (World Investment Report, 2005).  In 2008 due to 
the financial crisis, there was a steep decline of 35% in the value of cross-border deals 
compared to 2007. The number and value of megadeals fell by 21% and 31% respectively 
(World Development Report, 2009). Another notable fact is that after mid 2000s several 
developing countries started acquiring companies all over the world at astounding rates. In 
2014 the gross value of cross-border M&A was at $900 billion, considerably more than the 
recent annual average (2010-2014) which was $775 billion (World Investment Report, 
2015). Overall, cross border deals represent a major and stable segment of the mergers and 
acquisitions market with 33% of total M&A volume in 2015, against 37% in 2014 and 31% 
in 2013
2
.  
1.2 Motivation 
 From the Figure 2 it is clear that over the years the volume of the cross-border deals 
have increased considerably. Though there was a dramatic increase in the volume of cross-
border M&As in the last decade it is regrettable to say that the academic research on this 
field has not kept pace with the changes.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 As mentioned in the book ‘Cross border mergers and acquisitions’ – Scott C. Whitaker 
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Figure 2: Worldwide Cross-Border M&A Volume – 2005 to 2014 
 
 Source: Global M&A Financial Advisory Review 2014 – Thomson Reuters 
 
According to the Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and development report by 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000 cross-border M&A have been a popular strategy 
for firms over the past two decades. The growing popularity and importance of 
international M&As makes it an interesting topic for research. Therefore, it calls for a better 
understanding of the topic and to explore the determinants of the direction and size of the 
cross-border deals.  
1.3 Relevance and Research Question 
 Cross-border M&As are considered as implementation instrument by multinational 
corporations for diversification strategy (Rottig 2007). There has been an extensive 
literature addressing the various factors and motives for domestic M&As but the same 
cannot be said for cross-border M&As. Understanding the factors driving the volume of 
cross-border deals and the motives behind them will shed a light on their intricate 
workings.  
The complexity of the deals and the rapidly changing environment and the not so 
extensive research in international M&As emphasizes the necessity for an in-depth research 
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in order to add credible and reliable records to understand the dynamics behind cross-
border M&As. Understanding the factors that drive the volume may also help us to better 
understand the reasons for success/failure of a deal. According to The Economist 2007, 
cross-border M&As continue to be very popular and preferred mode of foreign direct 
investment despite the failure of majority deals to achieve pre-acquisition objectives. 
Therefore our goal is to study: 
 The pattern and determinants of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions. 
1.4 Structure 
 In order to  achieve our goal of understanding the determinants and pattern of cross-
border M&A, the study is organized as follows: Following this introductory section, section 
two contains the literature review of entry strategies in foreign markets and the main focus 
of the study -  cross-border M&A and its reasons and determinates. Section three 
summarizes the data used and the methodology employed to study the determinants of 
international M&A. Section four presents and discusses the results. Section five concludes 
and presents the implications for further research. 
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2. Literature Review  
 In this chapter, we will focus on the literature review related to internationalization 
process in brief in 2.1 Entry Strategies in Foreign Markets. Since the study focuses on 
Cross-border M&A, we provide various reasons and determinants of cross-border M&A 
based on several academic researches in 2.2 Reasons for Cross-border M&A and 2.3 
Determinants of Cross-border M&A. This section will lay the background to better 
understand the empirical results in the next chapter.  
2.1 Entry strategies in foreign markets 
 The best way to approach an international market and promote a company’s 
presence abroad is an important and strategic decision that should be taken based on the 
company’s objectives and available resources. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) state that, the 
most efficient mode of entry is one which maximizes long-term efficiency and is a function 
of trade-off between control and the cost of resource commitment. Also, the choice to go 
international should include proper consideration of other related costs and risks. 
 Johanson and Vahlne (1977), based on the empirical studies of Swedish firms, state 
that the internationalization process is undertaken in small steps rather than by making 
large foreign production investments at a single point of time. The internationalization 
process usually begins with exportation, which has lately become less suitable for many 
firms facing competitive threats. This stage is followed by firms formalizing their entry via 
deals with intermediaries in the foreign market. If there is sufficient growth in the sales, 
firms evaluate the possibility of replacing the intermediaries with their own sales 
organization overseas and subsequently a manufacturing unit (Figure 3). This helps the firm 
gather information and knowledge about the market conditions in the foreign country, 
whereby the firm can successfully and gradually move from exporting to foreign direct 
investment. 
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Figure 3: Internationalization Process 
 
Source: Adapted from (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a mode of entry offers two options – Greenfield 
investments and Cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Greenfield investment refers to 
establishment of new corporation in a foreign country, i.e building new operational 
facilities, whereas cross-border M&A is a quick way to obtain a strong position in a foreign 
country by acquiring existing firms. Both cross-border M&As and Greenfield investment 
have their own advantages and disadvantages. On one hand cross-border M&A is a quick 
option to enter the market and gain access to skilled workers, but the disadvantages lies 
with regards to integration process and the ever present cultural, organizational and 
communication problems. On the other hand, Greenfield investment is able to implement 
the best long-term strategy with greater control of business and economies of scale and the 
main disadvantage is it’s a long entry process with high level of investments, followed by 
government restrictions which can hinder the business.  
The choice to select the most promising and profitable mode of entry is dependent 
on a lot of aspects, it varies from country to country where macroeconomic factors play an 
important role and of course it also depends on industry and firm level factors. 
Export 
Franchising 
Branch 
FDI 
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2.2 Cross-Border M&As 
Cross-border M&As have grown rapidly during the past two decades. There has 
been a surge in the value of deals from $432 billion in 2014 to $721 billion (World 
Investment Report, 2016). They have added to the rapid globalization and restructuring of 
industries at an international level. Despite the fact that cross border M&A is a large part of 
worldwide merger activity, majority of the literature focuses on domestic deals. A quick 
view of the academic literature on cross-border M&A shows that it is fragmented across 
various disciplines and this topic has not been universally recognized warranting a 
distinctive examination separate from M&As (domestic) in general (Shimizu et al. 2004). 
Over the years the research on cross-border M&A has focused on several issues, 
such as form of FDI (Andersson and Svensson 1994; di Giovanni 2005), shareholder value 
creation (Datta and Puia 1995; Goergen and Renneboog 2004), capital markets (G. M. 
Vasconcellos and Kish 1998; McCann 2001), more recently performance of the firms 
(Slangen 2006; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, and Jayaraman 2009) and corporate 
governance (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Bris and Cabolis 2008; Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis 
2008).  
 Conceptually, cross-border M&As are very similar to domestic M&As, except for 
their international nature and unique cross-border challenges. National borders add an extra 
set of frictions that varies across countries, like economic, institutional and cultural 
differences, which can help make or break the cross-border deals (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 
2012). The increase in the volume of cross-border M&A worldwide brought forward 
several questions, more importantly – why do cross-border M&As occur and what are the 
determinants of cross-border M&As.  
2.2.1 Reasons for Cross-border M&A 
Generally, there is more than one reason why cross-border deals occur and they 
usually overlap. To better understand the reasons for cross-border M&A, we will present 
them in three broad categories: Strategic reasons, External Shocks and Personal motives. 
10 
 
A. Strategic Reasons 
 In cross-border M&As there is usually more than one strategic objective that drives 
a particular deal. Some of them are: 
Figure 4: Reasons for Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
(i)Synergies 
  Synergies are the most frequently cited reasons by managers for acquiring a firm. It 
is a motive for both domestic and international M&A. Synergies create value and are of two 
types – Operating synergies if there are economies of scale and scope, and informational 
synergies if the value of merged firm is higher than the sum of the individual firm values 
(Goergen and Renneboog 2004). 
 Operating synergies are derived when the contracting firms combine their 
operations and activities to increase the firm’s capacity and decrease the costs. This helps in 
taking full advantage of economies of scale and scope to generate long-term profits. 
Economies of scale reduce per unit cost, especially in capital-intensive manufacturing firms 
where per unit cost is high. Economies of scope help utilize a firm’s inputs across a broad 
range of products and services, for example cost savings from marketing and distribution. 
Informational synergies are obtained when rich firms with poor investment opportunities 
acquire smaller firms with outstanding growth opportunities. Some small firms might have 
excellent growth opportunities but sometimes due to poor managerial skills and lack of 
expertise hinders them to compete in a broader-market. When a larger firm acquires such a 
Strategic Reasons 
• Synergies 
• Market Power 
• Resource Seeking 
• Geographic 
Diversification 
External Shocks 
• Deregulation 
• Technological 
Changes 
• Financial Market 
Changes 
Personal Reasons 
• Agency Problem 
• Hubris and 
Winner's Curse 
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firm the smaller firm benefits from the best management and the acquirer’s management 
feels it can manage the target’s resources better. This argument is often presented as a 
reason when a large firm takeover smaller firms.  
(ii) Market Power 
 Market power is a product of the firm’s size, the degree of sustainability of its 
current competitive advantages and its ability to make decisions today that will yield new 
competitive advantages tomorrow (M. A. Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland 2001). The acquisition 
of competing firms through horizontal M&A results in a decrease in the number of players 
in a given industry and an increase in the market share, which in turn may have a 
significant impact on the combined firm’s market power, that is, its ability to set and 
maintain prices above competitive levels (Morresi and Pezzi 2014).  
 According to Hitt et al., (2001), market power can be achieved via cross-border 
M&A when the firm acquires:  
(a) Another firm operating in the same market via horizontal acquisition, this gives a huge 
advantage whereby the firm can control the prices,  
(b) Another firm through vertical M&A, like supplier or distributors, that control more 
segments of the value chain, which results in extra market power and finally; 
 (c) Another firm in a related industry.  
(iii)Resource Seeking 
 Several studies suggest that cross-border M&A are motivated by an opportunity to 
acquire new capabilities and learn new knowledge. Acquisition of existing international 
business allows the acquirer to gain access to resources such as patent-protected 
technology, superior managerial and marketing skills and special government regulation 
that creates an entry barrier for other firms (Glaister and Ahammad 2010).  
 Cross-border M&A not only aids in acquiring new capabilities but also to acquire 
missing capabilities and enhances the existing ones. It gives an easy access to new 
technology, which is otherwise a time consuming act requiring adoption of new technology, 
identifying the required skills for the new technology, training and supervision of hired 
individuals, etc. Therefore, it is more efficient to acquire a firm with a functioning unit 
12 
 
using the desired technology. Another strategic motivation is acquisition of complementary 
products, resources or knowledge. Cassiman et al. (2005) find that M&A between partners 
with complementary technologies result in more active R&D performance after the deal 
and prominent increase in R&D efficiency.  
(iv)Geographic Diversification 
 Diversification is a well-documented strategy for firm expansion and has been 
suggested as one of the dominant reasons for cross-border M&As (Glaister and Ahammad 
2010). Geographic diversification is where firms gain access to new growing markets that 
are comparatively profitable than the bidding country’s current market. A long line of 
research results has shown that the size of a country market is a significant factor attracting 
foreign firm investments
3
. Geographical market diversification is source of value in cross-
border M&A. This is because such sources of value are associated with exchange rate 
differences, market power due to international scope, and ability to arbitrage tax regimes 
are unique to international mergers
4
. 
 Lu and Beamish (2004) state that geographic diversification provides both 
exploration and exploitation benefits. Some of the major exploitation benefits are it enables 
firms to achieve economies of scale and scope, decrease revenue fluctuations by spreading 
investment risks over different countries, and helps in promoting a firm’s market power 
over its suppliers, distributors and customers. But the initial impetus to a firm’s 
internationalization process comes from the opportunity to exploit market imperfections in 
the cross-border use of its intangible assets. And the exploration benefits can be drawn 
from a firm’s organizational learning perspective. This perspective emphasizes that 
acquiring firm’s subsidiaries in disparate host countries can help enhance its knowledge 
base, capabilities and competitiveness through experiential learning. 
B. External Shocks 
The external shocks that motivate cross-border M&A deals can be summarized as 
follows: 
                                                 
3
 According to Buckley et., 2007 as mentioned in (Chari and Acikgoz 2016) 
4
 According to Seth(1990) as mentioned in (Glaister and Ahammad 2010) 
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(i) Deregulation 
 Changes in the policy and regulatory environment during the past decade have 
provided more space for international production systems to expand. Examples of such 
changes relevant to cross-border M&As include the removal of compulsory joint venture 
requirements, restrictions on majority ownership and authorization requirements (Chen and 
Findlay 2003). Deregulation limits the restrictions on a firm’s expansion and entry and aids 
in creating new investment opportunities. Main industries that have undertaken significant 
deregulation since the 1970s are natural gas and airlines (1978), trucking (1980), 
broadcasting (1984 & 1996), entertainment (1984), utilities (1992), banking (1994) and 
telecommunications (1996) (Morresi and Pezzi 2014). 
 Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) show that one particular kind of industry 
shock, deregulation, while important in previous periods, becomes dominant factor in 
merger and acquisition activity after the late 1980s and accounts for nearly half of the 
merger activity since then. The authors explaining the causes of mergers and acquisitions 
state that the 1990s were the “decade of deregulation”. 
(ii) Technological changes 
 Technological shocks can come in many forms as technological changes can bring 
about drastic changes in existing industries and can even create new ones (Gaughan 2007). 
The recent surge of cross-border activities in telecommunications, media and information 
industries reflect the efforts of firms to capturer new markets created by new technologies. 
Technological changes have different types of effects in stimulating cross-border M&A. On 
one hand, decreasing communication and transportation costs have favored international 
expansion of firms seeking to exploit and consolidate their competitive advantage. On the 
other hand, the soaring costs of R&D together with the uncertainties of technological 
change, have forced firms to co-operate with others in global markets through various 
strategic alliances (Kang and Johansson 2000). 
(iii) Financial market changes 
 According to the reports of Bank of America, the problems related to the financing 
of entrepreneurial and private activities are brought about by turbulences in financial 
markets (Sedláček, Konečný, and Valouch 2011), which of course effects the volume of 
deals. Changes in the financial markets like the introduction of innovative products or 
14 
 
techniques helped in facilitating or preventing takeovers. For example, during the fourth 
merger wave, the investment bank of Drexel Burnham Lambert pioneered the development 
and growth of the junk bond market. These junk bonds which were previously regarded 
unworthy became a popular vehicle of investment for corporate raiders to raise required 
capital for their raids or acquisitions of big prominent corporations (Gaughan 2007). 
 Harford (2005), who studies the reason for clustering of mergers at the aggregate 
level, states that merge waves occur in response to specific industry shocks that require 
large scale reallocation of assets. For merger wave to take effect economic, technological 
and regulatory shocks are not enough on their own, there must be sufficient capital liquidity 
to accommodate the asset allocation. The increase in capital liquidity and reduction in 
financing constraints which are correlated to high asset values must be present for the shock 
to develop into a wave.  
C. Personal Reasons 
 Personal reasons to merge or acquire firms stem when the managers are intent on 
maximizing their own utility. We will discuss the following two specific reasons why 
managers undertake M&As: 
(i) Agency Problem: 
 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency problem is inherent to any 
principal-agent relationship and refers to the conflict of interest on the agent’s part to act in 
the best interest of the principal. In the corporate world, it means that the manager of the 
company is expected to act in the best interests of the shareholders at all times i.e the 
decisions taken by him should maximize the shareholders’ wealth and not his own.  
 Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000) mention that managerial hypothesis suggests that 
managers embark on M&A in order to maximize their own utility at the expense of the 
shareholders of the firm. In their study on managerialism as a motive for cross-border 
M&A, they mention that foreign acquisitions may be more satisfactory vehicle of  risk 
reduction than domestic acquisitions and that the cross-border acquisitions characterized  
by value destruction appear to be driven by managerialism.  
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Managers can also have private or personal reasons for their decision to make 
investments which from an economic point of view may seem irrational, but personally can 
be of high value. The empire building theory maintains that management want firm growth 
for personal reasons and acquisitions provide the required growth. An important example is 
the wage explanation, whereby the compensation paid to the managers is related  to the size 
of the company (Glaister and Ahammad 2010).  
(ii) Hubris and the Winner’s Curse 
 The Hubris hypothesis, proposed by Roll (1986), states that decision makers in 
acquiring firms pay too much for their targets. Essentially, the hypothesis relies upon 
asymmetric beliefs by the bidder and target about wealth gains associated with an 
acquisition, with the bidder mistakenly overvaulting the target while believing that his 
valuation is correct (Seth et al., 2000). Hubris is responsible for the winner’s curse 
phenomenon. Although the deal offers synergies, the competition between the bidders may 
cause the winning bidder to pay too much. In this sense, the winner is cursed even after 
winning the bid by paying excessively high price.  
 Seth et a., (2000) mention that hubris hypothesis is relevant in explaining cross-
border M&A as there is greater information asymmetry between foreign bidders and 
domestic targets than between domestic bidders and targets. They also find that hubris 
hypothesis plays an important role in value creating transactions. 
2.2.2 Determinants of Cross-border M&As 
  Over the past two decades there have been several studies trying to understand 
what drives the volume of these cross border deals. The underlying drivers of these deals 
are complex and vary according to sector (Kang and Johansson 2000). Generally mergers 
occur when the controlling persons of the firm feel the value derived from a combined firm 
is higher than the value of the same firms individually (Seth et al., 2000). A lot of factors 
play a role in determining this value, especially when it’s an international deal, where 
national boundary frictions come into play.  
 Economic growth influences both the supply and demand for cross-border M&As 
(Kang and Johansson 2000). Several studies focused on the macroeconomic factors to 
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understand the flow of the cross-border deals. Geraldo M. Vasconcellos, Madura, and Kish 
(1990); G. M. Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) have stressed the importance of 
macroeconomic factors to understand the trends in cross-border deals over time. Over the 
past century various factors have been identified as contributing to the rise in the number of 
cross-border deals. We will discuss several of them in this section. 
 
Figure 5: Determinants of Cross-border M&A 
 
A. Exchange rates  
 Exchange rates can influence the flow and direction of cross-border M&As in 
several ways. The relative strength, appreciation or depreciation, of the domestic currency 
to the foreign currency aids in decision making. According to Geraldo M. Vasconcellos and 
Kish (1996)
5, the effective price of the transaction, it’s financing, the cost of managing the 
acquired firm and the repatriated profits of the firm are all affected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Authors view was based on a comprehensive discussion found in Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) 
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Figure 6: Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Source: Froot and Stein (1991) 
 Froot and Stein (1991) state, there is a relationship between exchange rates and 
foreign acquisition activity. However, they argue that a fall in the value of the dollar makes 
the US a cheaper place to conduct business be it foreign or domestic. Predictably, there are 
contrasting academic views as to the role and effect of exchange rates on international 
M&A.   
 Uddin and Boateng (2011) conducted a study on the impact of macroeconomic 
influences on the cross-border M&A activities in the UK. They used new macroeconomic 
variables which were not a part of location-specific advantages during 1970s to explain the 
trend in overall cross-border M&As.  Their results on outward M&A regression show a 
positive and significant relationship between sterling appreciation and outbound cross-
border M&A deals. This finding supports the notion that a strong sterling in comparison to 
foreign currencies should result in increased trends in outbound cross-border deals as it 
makes foreign assets cheaper to acquire. Consistent with the above view Erel, Liao, and 
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Weisbach (2012) show that currency movements are a major factor in cross-border M&A. 
They find that short term movements in the currencies of the two countries increase the 
likelihood of purchasing the firms in the depreciating currency country by the country 
whose currency is appreciating.  
 However, McCann (2001), who analyzed cross-border acquisition activities in the 
UK from 1987-1995, reaches a different conclusion. His study suggests that exchange rate 
is a crucial factor in determining the cross-border M&A. But there is an inconsistency in 
the relationship – his results showed a negative relationship between both inbound and 
outbound acquisitions and exchange rates. Goldberg (1993) came to similar conclusions in 
her study about investment activity in US industry. Her results represented that dollar 
depreciations in 1980s reduced investments in several sectors and had mixed effects in 
others. 
 Several other authors have also explored the relation between exchange rates and 
foreign acquisitions. Blonigen (1997) have studied the connection between exchange rates 
and FDI acquisitions involving firm-specific assets and found that there is a strong 
correlation between periods of weaker dollar and higher levels of acquisition in US 
industries. On the other hand Görg and Wakelin (2002) study reveals that an exchange rate 
variation has no effect on US outward and inward investment. Kiyota and Urata (2004) 
explain these mixed results are due to aggregation of national data. While there are mixed 
conclusions, the effect of exchange rate activity is ultimately an empirical question
6
. 
B. Financial development  
 Financial development in a country promotes economic growth and plays an 
important role in understanding several phenomena. Financial development is defined as a 
combination of depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (ability of individuals to access 
financial services), and efficiency (ability of institutions to provide financial services at low 
cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets)
7
.  Financial 
                                                 
6
 See (Goldberg 1993; Geraldo M. Vasconcellos and Kish 1996; G. M. Vasconcellos and Kish 1998) 
7
 As mentioned in IMF Staff Discussion Notes – Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in 
Emerging Markets. 
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depth, defined as the level of development of financial markets
8
, of a country determines 
what kind of financing is available to the firms and whether they  
 
Figure 7: World Stock Market Capitalization 
 
Source: American Enterprise Institute (https://www.aei.org/worldcap-9/) 
can undertake a particular investment or forego it. Financial depth is measured either by 
size (market capitalization) or liquidity (value of shares traded as a percentage of gross 
domestic product)
9
. Figure 7 shows the world stock market capitalization released by 
World Federation of Exchanges as of end of December 2012. The remarkable increase in 
the stock market capitalization is a notable feature and raises a question whether a country’s 
financial development affects its firms to invest abroad. 
di Giovanni (2005) conducted a study using gravity model framework on a large 
data – world international M&A flows from 1990-1999 to uncover the determinants of the 
                                                 
8
 According to (Christopoulos and Tsionas 2004) 
9
 As mentioned in The World Bank – World Federation of Exchanges database. 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2015&start=1990&view=chart) 
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size and direction of international M&A. According to data used in his study the value of 
the M&A deals have increase seven fold over the data period. The main hypothesis of his 
paper is to test whether the financially deep markets in the acquiring countries are 
positively associated to cross-border M&A. His results showed that the development of 
financial markets in the country of acquisition matters and that particularly stock market 
plays an important role. Furthermore, his specification shows “a 1% increase in the stock 
market capitalization to GDP ratio in the acquiring country is associated with a 0.955% 
increase in cross-border M&A activity”. Hyun and Kim (2010) incorporated the quality of 
institutions in host countries and financial deepening in home countries together to explain 
the determinants of the size and direction of cross-border M&As. The study draws several 
conclusions – firstly they state that external push factors and internal pull factors of a 
country can explain the cross-border M&A flows and second value of M&As can increase 
depending on the institutional quality of host country and financial deepening of the source 
country. His results showed that across country samples of determinants of cross-border 
M&A, stock market capitalization, trade, common language and distance are robustly 
significant. 
According to Hur, Parinduri, and Riyanto (2011), whose focus of study was on the 
uneven distribution of cross-border M&A inflows to developing and developed countries, 
the level of financial development of host countries doesn’t seem to be an important 
determinant of M&A inflows. Based on di-Giovanni’s (2005) and their result the authors 
state that the level of financial development of origin countries matters and not that of host 
countries.  
C. Corporate Governance 
In Coffee (1999) view, Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions activity is an 
important tool for effective worldwide convergence of corporate governance standards. 
Recent research shows that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong 
investor protection, where investor protection can be defined as the extent of the laws that 
protects investors’ rights and the strength of legal institutions that facilitate law 
enforcement (Defond and Hung 2004).  
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According to La Porta et al. (1997), there are four broad “origins” or “families” governing 
the laws of investor protection and commercial law – English or common law, French civil 
law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil law. LaPorta et al. (1998) created an index 
for shareholder and creditor rights for 49 countries. The focus of their study was on two 
types of law relating to investor protection: company laws and bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws.  Based on this data they found systematic variation in laws, regulations 
and enforcement quality across countries. Two major facts they noticed from the analysis of 
shareholder and creditor rights are that: common law countries provide the best legal 
protection to shareholders and that French civil law offers the worst. German civil law 
countries are in between and with comparatively stronger protection for creditors 
(especially for secured creditors). Scandinavian origin countries have an intermediate 
stance as well.  The legal differences between origins are best described by the extent to 
which they protect minority investors better than others and not by the extent to which 
some countries protect creditors and the some countries protect shareholders. 
The indexes developed by LLSV (1998) were later used by several researchers as proxies 
for investor protection for various studies related to corporate governance. La Porta et al. 
(2000) argued that an active market for mergers and acquisitions is the outcome of a 
corporate governance regime with strong investor protection. Pagano, Röell, and Zechner 
(2002) and Reese Jr. and Weisbach (2002) have shown that firms from countries with weak 
legal protection for minority shareholders list abroad more frequently that firms from other 
countries. Rossi and Volpin (2004) have found that the volume of M&A activity is 
significantly larger in countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder 
protection. They have also shown that, in cross border mergers and acquisitions targets are 
typically from countries with poor investor protection that the acquiring countries.  
One of the main results of Bris and Cabolis (2008) is that acquisitions of firms in 
weaker shareholder protection countries by firms in stronger protective regimes results in a 
higher premium, as compared to a similar target in a domestic acquisition. Their research 
compliments that of Rossi and Volpin (2004) and shows that corporate governance can be a 
motive for cross border acquisitions. Wang and Xie (2009) provide evidence on the 
hypothesis that acquisitions of poorly managed targets by well-run acquirers create more 
value than other acquisitions. After further analyses on  shareholders rights they have come 
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to a conclusion that differences in shareholder rights has remarkable positive effects on 
both target and acquirer shareholder gains, indicating that targets and acquirers share the 
valuation effects of corporate governance transfers. 
Later on the anti-directors index was criticized for its ad hoc nature and several 
conceptual ambiguities (Pagano and Volpin 2005). Djankov et al. (2008) created the anti-
self-dealing index a new measure of legal protection for minority shareholders against 
expropriation. It was put together with the help of Lex Mundi law firms for 72 countries. It 
is calculated based on legal rules prevailing in 2003 with main focus on private 
enforcement mechanisms such as approval, litigation and disclosure that govern a specific 
self-dealing transaction. 
One obvious question arises when you have different measures of shareholder 
protection, although collected with a different methodology and addressing different 
situations, ‘What is the “best” measure to use for research purposes?’ Answering the 
question Djankov et al (2008) state that “In terms of predicting stock market outcomes the 
measure of shareholder protection from securities laws seems feasible but the data is 
limited to 49 countries. These measures suit best for studies of protection of investors 
buying securities rather than corporate governance. Then we have the revised anti-director 
rights index which is now available for 72 countries and has the advantage of continuity 
with previous studies. Finally, the anti-self-dealing index which is also available for 72 
countries is conceptually clearer and deals directly with problem of corporate self-dealing.” 
D. Cultural values, Trade and Geographic proximity 
 Some of the recent researches show that cultural values affect a number of financial 
outcomes in markets worldwide
10
. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) define culture as 
“those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious and social groups transmit fairly 
unchanged from generation to generation.” In cross border M&A, the contracting countries 
have their own cultural identities, people speak different languages, follow their own 
religions and most often times have longstanding feuds. All of which affects the cost of 
combining firms across borders.  
                                                 
10
 FDI – Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), Equity investment – Hwang (2011) and Venture-capital flows 
– Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2010), as mentioned (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 2015). 
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Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) suggest that cultural relationships are “an important 
omitted factor in international trade and investments.” Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi 
(2015) study the impact of national cultural values on the pattern of cross-border M&A. 
Based on 20,893 cross-border mergers over 1991-2008 from 52 different countries, they 
find that culture has a significant and meaningful effect on the volume of cross-border 
M&As. Their results show a strong negative relationship between the cultural difference of 
the two countries and the volume of cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity between 
them and state that cultural differences impose costly frictions between firms which lead to 
fewer mergers. 
 Cultural disparities also play a crucial role in determining the performance of an 
M&A deal. The empirical research on the relationship between cultural differences and 
M&A performance led to inconclusive results – some studies found positive impact, others 
found a negative and others indicated non-significant results. Chakrabarti, Gupta-
Mukherjee, and Jayaraman (2009) find a positive relationship and their results show that 
cross-border acquisitions perform better in the long run if the acquirer and target are from 
countries that are culturally diverse. On the other hand Datta and Puia (1995) state that 
acquisitions characterized by high cultural distance were accompanied by lower wealth 
effects for acquiring firm shareholders, thereby reducing foreign acquisition performance. 
Taking an intermediate stance Slangen (2006) argue that the effect of national cultural 
disparities on cross-border M&A performance is neither consistently positive nor  negative 
but depends on the level of post-acquisition integration. 
 The level of trade between two countries is an important facilitator for cross-border 
M&A. It not only signals the importance of the host country but also serves as a stepping 
stone for direct expansion in the future. Firms exploit the relative expertise and the 
international competitive advantage by seeking more permanent ties with their trading 
partner which they either integrate into their own operations or decide to serve locally 
through acquisitions. And the quickest way to establish a direct presence is through 
acquisitions of assets in that country. Cross-border M&A activity therefore tends to 
increase with greater bilateral trade. Hyun and Kim (2010), who studied the determinants of 
cross-border M&As, based on their results state that among others trade is robustly 
significant determinants of cross-border M&A and stable institutions and an open trade 
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policy, particularly in the host developing countries, can contribute significantly to 
attracting more inward M&A flows from developed countries. di Giovanni (2005) also 
mentions that firms tend to invest more in the countries that they trade with and regional 
trade agreements are significant driving variables. 
Studies on geographic distance have gained  momentum in several business areas 
such as mergers and acquisitions (Chakrabarthi & Mitchell 2006, Grote & Umber 2006, 
Grote and Rucker 2007), entrepreneurship (Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson 1993, Lerner 
1995, Audretsch & Feldman 1996, Audertsch & Stephan 1996) and financial economics 
(Coval & Moskowitz 1999, Garmaise & Moskowitz 2004, Bae,Stulz & Tan 2005, Pirinsky 
& Wang 2006)
11
. Geographic distance is considered as a determinant of volume of cross-
border M&A. There have been very few studies exploring this factor as a potential driver. 
Green,(1987), who examined the effect of distance on acquisition patterns for every fifth 
year from 1955-1980, found that acquisition activity usually concentrates geographically 
close to the acquiring firm’s corporate headquarters and that the volume of targets decline 
with distance. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012), who studied the effect of geographic 
proximity with respect to cross-border M&A, stated that geography matters and that the 
odds of acquiring a firm in a nearby country is substantially higher than the odds of 
acquiring a firm in a country far away. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 As mentioned in ‘The effects of geographic distance on the foreign acquisition activity of US firms’ – 
Roberto Ragozzino (2009) 
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3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we will first discuss about the focus and aim of this study in 3.1 
Research Focus and Goals. In section 3.2 we present the data used and the methodology 
employed to achieve our goals.  
3.1 Research Focus and Goals 
 Most of the M&A literature continue to be dominated by financial and market 
studies, with a high concentration of interest in the USA and UK (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg 2006). To the extent of our knowledge there have been very few academic 
papers in cross-border M&A field where the focus is on particular country or region apart 
from US and UK. Therefore our main focus of study is on the Nordic region. There aren’t 
many papers exploring the cross-border M&A features in this region. So to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first study analyzing the determinants of cross-border M&A in 
the Scandinavia area.  
 Therefore, based on the literature review on several country level determinants of 
cross-border M&A and the above mentioned view, our main goal in this thesis is to: 
 Study the pattern of cross-border M&A, where the acquirers are from Nordic 
countries 
 Determine which country level factors affect the cross-border M&As activity, where 
the acquirers are from Nordic countries 
 Analyze overall as well as country wise determinants of Nordic cross-border M&A 
activity.  
3.2 Data and Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
 Our cross-border M&A sample is collected from Zephyr, where the deals are 
announced and completed during the period 2003 -2014.  The deals are selected on the 
basis of following criteria: 
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 Where the acquirer is from one of the Nordic regions i.e., Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
 Where the type of deal is either mergers or acquisitions 
 Where the percentage of stake acquired is 51% or more 
 Where the deals involving the target or acquirer from the public or financial 
sector are excluded. 
After applying the said restrictions and cleaning the data we are left with a total of 4592 
cross-border deals with 97 different countries. Figure 8, which reflects the above deals, 
shows the volume of deals by the Nordic region on a yearly basis. Out of this we remove 18 
countries as they have data on one to two variables only. This leaves us with a total of 232 
observations for the dependent variable
12
.  
Figure 8: Volume of Cross-border Deals – Nordic Acquirers 
 
Following are the list of explanatory variables: 
                                                 
12
 We included the deals with the Nordic countries as well as there isn’t a significant difference in the results. 
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A. Currency 
 Currency is defined as the difference between the real exchanges rates of the 
acquiring and target country’s currencies expressed in USD. We obtain the monthly 
national exchange rates from WM/Reuters through Datastream. In order to calculate real 
exchange rates we obtain consumer price index (CPI) from The World Development 
Indicators and convert all the nominal prices to 2010 price level. The data on exchange rate 
is missing for 18 countries, which leaves us with 201 observations. We use this variable to 
see the effect of valuation difference between the countries as determinant for cross-border 
M&A (Erel et al., 2012). We expect to see a positive relationship between the volume of 
cross-border deals and Currency. 
B. Market Return 
 Market return is defined as the difference between the real stock market returns of 
the acquiring and target countries expressed in thousands of USD. We obtain the monthly 
country level stock exchange returns in US dollars from Datastream. In order to calculate 
real Stock market returns we obtain consumer price index (CPI) from The World 
Development Indicators and convert all the nominal prices to 2010 price level. We are 
missing data on stock market returns for 25 countries, which gives us 188 observations in 
total. We use this variable to see the effect of valuation difference between the countries as 
determinant for cross-border M&A (Erel et al., 2012). We expect to see a positive 
relationship. 
C. Investor Protection 
 This variable is defined as the difference between the Investor protection level of 
the acquiring and target country. As proxy for Investor protection we use the anti-self-
dealing index from (Djankov et al. 2008). It measures the protection of minority investors 
from conflicts of interest through one set of indicators and shareholders’ rights in corporate 
governance through another. It a good measure of country’s accounting, legal and 
institutional standards. Investor Protection is available for only 64 countries and we have 
total of 195 observations for this variable. We expect to see a positive relationship between 
the dependent variable and the Investor Protection. 
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D. Tax and Geographic Distance 
 Tax is defined as the difference between the average corporate tax of the acquirer 
and target. The average corporate tax data was obtained from “Corporate Tax Rates Table | 
KPMG | GLOBAL” 2015 for 2006-2015. We have total of 226 observations for this 
variable. We do not expect any particular relationship with tax and the dependent variable. 
 Geographic distance is the difference between the capital cities of the acquirer and 
target in thousands of kilometers. To measure the great circle distance between the acquirer 
and target countries, we use the longitude and latitude of the capital cities from 
mapsofworld.com
13
 (Erel et al., 2012). We use this variable to see the how the geographic 
between the acquirer and target effects the volume of the cross-border deals. We have a 
total of 232 observations and we expect to see a negative relationship between the 
dependent and the geographic distance. 
E. Dummy and Control Variables 
 As a proxy for cultural difference we use Religion (Erel et al., 2012). We were not 
able to use the language as none of the target countries share the same language. The 
dummy variable (Religion) takes the value one if the acquirer and target share the same 
religion if not zero. The data on religion practiced in each country is obtained from The 
World Factbook.  
 As control variable we use bilateral trade and logarithm of GNP per capita. Bilateral 
trade is the number of imports from the acquiring country by the target as a percent of total 
imports by the target country (Rossi and Volpin 2004). We obtain this trade information 
from UN COMTRADE, WITS. And finally the Log of GNP per capita is defined as the 
difference between the annual average of Log of GNP per capita of the acquirer and the 
target. GNP per capital of the acquiring and target countries was obtained from World 
Development Indicators. We expect to see a positive relationship between bilateral trade 
and the dependent. 
 
                                                 
13
 The formula used to calculate the great circle distance in kilometers is: acos[cos{radians(90-
lat1)}*cos{radians(90-lat2)}+sin{radians(90-lat1)}*sin{radians(90-lat2)}*cos{radians(lon1-lon2)}]*6371, 
where lon and lat are the longitude and latitude of the acquirer and target country locations, respectively.  
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Table 1: Expected results 
Variable Expected Sign Justification 
Currency Positive Uddin and Boateng (2012) and Erel et al., (2012) 
Market Return Positive Erel et al., (2012) 
Investor Protection Positive Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
Geographic Proximity Negative Green (1987) & Erel et al., (2012) 
Bilateral trade Positive Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
To understand the cross-sectional pattern among the acquirers and target countries 
we use the least squares framework. Our goal is to measure the factors affecting the volume 
of cross-border deals of the Nordic acquirers to acquirer from firms from other countries. In 
this section we present the specification we employ and the variables used. The 
specification is: 
Cross-border deals s,b = βX s,b + γ∆ (exhange rate)s,b + δ∆ (market return)s,b + 
εΔ(investor protection)s,b + ζΔ (corporate tax)s,b + ηb +θs +λs,b 
Our dependent variable measures the volume of cross-border M&As for a particular 
country pair over the sample period. It defined as the number of cross-border deals in which 
the acquirer b, comes from one of the Nordic countries and the target s from another 
country (b≠s), as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) in 
the target country
14
. 
 We include the real exchange rate (Currency) and real stock market return (Market 
Return) difference between the acquirer and target over the sample period to check for 
valuation effect (Erel et al., 2012). Since better  investor protection is associated with 
higher volume of takeovers (Rossi and Volpin 2004) we include anti- self-dealing index 
(Investor Protection) as a proxy for investor protection take from Djankov et al. (2008). 
Further, we also include average difference in corporate tax rates (Tax) between the 
acquirer and target countries for the period 2006 – 2014 as the difference in international 
                                                 
14
 This approach follows (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012). 
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tax rates could be a motive for cross-border M&A. For the regional effect we include the 
distance between the capital cities of the acquirer and target countries (Geographic 
Distance). 
 To control for the differences in macroeconomic conditions and volume of business 
between the two countries we use, logarithm of GNP per capita (Log (GNP per capita)) and 
bilateral imports (Bilateral Trade) between the countries.  
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4. Results & Discussion 
 
In this section we will present and discuss the results starting with the Nordic 
acquirers as a whole and an individual study of each of the four countries. 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Nordic Acquirers 
 Over the sample period the Nordic countries as a whole undertaken 4952 cross-
border deals with 99 different countries. Figure 9 shows the volume of deals over the 
sample period and Figure 10 shows the distribution of these deals among the continents
15
. 
Out of the 99 countries, we don’t have sufficient data for 19 countries mentioned in the 
previous sections. This leaves us with a total of 232 observations for our regression 
analysis. 
Figure 9: Volume of Cross-border deals - Nordic Acquirers
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 The continents are divided into 7 – Africa, Asia, Australia & Oceania, Europe, North America and South 
America – mapsofworld.com     
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Figure 10: Cross-border deals distribution - Nordic Acquirers 
 
 
 Table 2 shows correlations between the variables and Table 3 below shows the 
mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation values. You can that there is a very 
high correlation between the dependent variable and the bilateral trade. None of the other 
variables have such high correlation. 
Table 2: Correlations – Nordic Acquirers 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependent         
2 Currency 0.10        
3 Market Ret. -0.02 0.06       
4 IP 0.15 0.02 -0.004      
5 Tax 0.10 0.05 -0.05 -0.0005     
6 GD -0.28 0.24 0.05 -0.52 -0.27    
7 Religion 0.35 -0.10 0.00 -0.17 -0.29 -0.05   
8 Ln(GNP) -0.18 0.36 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.23 -0.33  
9 Bilateral 
Trade 
0.82 -0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.32 0.53 -0.29 
IP – Investor protection. GD – Geographic distance 
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Table 3: Mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum & Standard Deviation - Nordic Acquirers 
 Y Currency Market Ret. IP Tax GP Religion Ln(GNP) Bilateral 
Trade 
Mean 1.03 -0.18 -22474.81 -0.06 0.49 4648.62 0.20 1.26 1.47 
Median 0.32 -0.03 269.49 -0.01 0.20 2402.01 0.00 1.07 0.53 
Maximum 20.00 1.42 1487.24 0.38 17.33 17960.68 1.00 9.87 62.16 
Minimum 0.02 -1.97 -955131.50 -0.67 -30.00 0.48 -0.20 -0.77 0.02 
Std. Dev 2.24 0.81 139148.10 0.25 8.15 4312.82 0.40 1.20 4.56 
          
Obs 232 197 185 195 226 232 232 229 228 
Y – Dependent variable and IP- Investor Protection. 
To analyze the pattern and determinants of the cross-border M&A of Nordic 
acquirers and its target we run a least square methods test on the cross-sectional data. Our 
dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals with the target country where the 
acquiring country is any of the four Nordic countries as a percentage of the total number of 
deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the target. Table 4 contains the estimate of 
our regression. Bilateral trade and Log (GNP per capita) are our control variables. 
The results of our regression show that in column 2, the coefficient of investor 
protection is positive and highly significant. This result is similar to our expectation and 
shows the Nordic acquires as a whole target those countries whose investor protection 
levels are low in comparison to theirs. Log (GNP per capita) is significant as well, which 
means that the targets are from comparatively poorer countries than the acquirers. 
 In column 5, we see that currency is positive and significant, consistent with our 
expectations. This implies that Nordic acquirers on an average targeted the countries whose 
currencies have depreciated over the sample period. Next we can see that the coefficient of 
Market return is negative and highly significant. This shows that the targets are typically 
from countries whose stock market performance is better that than the acquirers’. The 
variables tax, geographic distance, religion and log of GNP per capita are not significant. 
Bilateral is significant throughout all the equations, highlighting its importance and impact 
on the volume of cross-border deals.  
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Table 4: Cross-sectional data results – Nordic Acquirers 
This table presents the results of five least squares method regressions where the acquiring countries belong to 
one of the four Nordic countries. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where the 
acquiring country belongs to any of the four Nordic countries as a percentage of the total number of deals in 
the target country. The independent variable are the difference between the acquiring and target country’s – 
exchange rates, stock market returns, anti-self-dealing index – proxy for investor protection, corporate tax and 
geographical distance between the capital cities. We include logarithm of GNP per capital and bilateral trade, 
measured as total number imports from the acquirer by the target country as a percent of total trade (imports 
& exports)  by the target, as control variables. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if the 
acquirer and the target country share the same religion. The errors shown in the parentheses are adjusted for 
hetroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Currency 0.0785    0.2157*** 
 (0.1426)    (0.0715) 
Market Return -0.0004    -0.0006*** 
 (0.0003)    (0.0001) 
Investor Protection  0.4915***  0.3119*** 
  (0.1702)   (0.0093) 
Tax   -0.0108  0.01250 
   (0.0080)  (0.0063) 
Geographic Distance    0.0181 0.0038 
    (0.0304) (0.0102) 
Religion    0.7416 -0.1859 
    (0.4950) (0.1175) 
Log (GNP per 
capita) 
0.0573 0.0982** 0.2253** 0.1152 -0.0146 
 (0.0674) (0.0440) (0.1084) (0.1342) (0.2922) 
Bilateral Trade 0.4291*** 0.3761*** 0.3625*** 0.1625*** 0.4550*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0693) (0.0667) (0.0285) (0.0549) 
Constant 0.0803 0.1243 0.1463 0.4126* 0.1517 
 (0.0927) (0.0917) (0.2144) (0.2345) (0.0980) 
      
R
2
 0.56 0.52 0.16 0.15 0.70 
N Observations 182 191 221 227 166 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.1.2 Denmark 
 Over the sample period Denmark has done 894 cross-border deals with 72 different 
countries. Figure 11 shows the volume of deals over the sample period and Figure 12 shows 
the distribution of these deals among the continents. Out of the 72 countries, we were 
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missing data on 7 seven countries
16
 which leaves us with 66 observations for the dependent 
variable.  
Figure 11: Volume of Cross-border deals – Danish Acquirers 
 
 
Figure 12: Cross-border deals distribution – Danish acquirers
 
                                                 
16
 Bermuda, Congo, Djibouti, Faroe Islands, Lao and Marshall Islands, all of which had one cross border deal 
with Denmark. 
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Table 5 shows the correlations between the variables and Table 6 shows the mean, 
median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values. 
 
Table 5: Correlations - Denmark 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependent        
2 Currency 0.23        
3 Market Ret. -0.14 0.02       
4 IP 0.24 -0.04 -0.02      
5 Tax 0.12 0.18 -0.12 0.00     
6 GD -0.25 0.37 0.08 -0.54 -0.27    
7 Religion 0.40 -0.17 0.05 -0.20 -0.33 0.01   
8 Ln(GNP) -0.18 0.67 -0.09 -0.04 0.08 0.27 -0.32  
9 Bilateral 
Trade 
0.88 0.03 0.05 0.16 0.04 -0.33 0.55 -0.34 
IP – Investor protection. GD – Geographic distance 
 
Table 6: Mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum & Standard Deviation - Denmark 
 Y Currency Market 
Ret. 
IP Tax GP Religion Ln(GNP) Bilateral 
Trade 
Mean 1.43 -0.46 -20776.56 -0.01 -0.37 5097.60 0.20 1.14 1.89 
Median 0.37 -0.41 725.67 0.04 -0.73 3198.77 0.00 0.99 0.45 
Maximum 20.00 0.25 1487.24 0.38 14.72 17960.68 1.00 3.96 62.16 
Minimum 0.03 -1.57 -954258.70 -0.54 -
29.72 
358.28 0.00 -0.56 0.08 
Std. Dev 3.52 0.58 136316.20 0.25 7.92 4426.70 0.40 0.94 7.88 
          
Obs 66 51 49 53 62 66 66 65 63 
Y – Dependent variable and IP- Investor Protection. 
 
 To analyze the pattern and determinants of the cross-border M&A between 
Denmark and its target we run a least square methods test on the cross-sectional data. Our 
dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is 
Denmark as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) 
undertaken by the target. Table 7 contains the estimate of our regression. 
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Table 7: Cross-sectional data results – Denmark 
This table presents the results of five least squares method regressions for 66 countries with Denmark as the 
acquiring country. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is 
Denmark as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the target. 
The independent variable are the difference between Denmark and target country’s – exchange rates, stock 
market returns, anti-self-dealing index – proxy for investor protection, corporate tax and geographical 
distance between the capital cities. We include logarithm of GNP per capital and bilateral trade, measured as 
total number imports from Denmark by the target country as a percent of total trade (imports & exports)  by 
the target, as control variables. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if Denmark and the target 
country share the same religion. The errors shown in the parentheses are adjusted for hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     
Currency 0.2450*** 
   
0.2220** 
 (0.0681) 
   
(0.0886) 
Market Return -0.0007*** 
   
-0.0007*** 
 (0.00003) 
   
(0.00006) 
Investor Protection 
 
0.4868* 
  
0.2983*** 
 
 
(0.2623) 
  
(0.0933) 
Tax 
  
-0.0214 
 
0.0040 
 
  
(0.0180) 
 
(0.0062) 
Geographic 
Distance    
0.1431 0.0076 
 
   
(0.0886) (0.0093) 
Religion 
   
0.7075 -0.0028 
 
   
(1.5730) (0.1166) 
Log (GNP per 
capita) 
-0.0406 0.0989** -0.1632 -0.4358 -0.0388 
 (0.0337) (0.0464) (0.2306) (0.3391) (0.0384) 
Bilateral Trade 0.2971*** 0.2627*** 0.1195 0.1274*** 0.2980*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0496) (0.1382) (0.0291) (0.0348) 
Constant 0.3153*** 0.1475** 1.0105 0.9046 0.2763** 
 (0.0760) (0.0657) (0.7035) (0.5939) (0.1148) 
 
     
R
2
 0.84 0.55 0.014 0.13 0.85 
N Observations 48 51 59 63 45 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
In column 1, we introduce the exchange rate difference and the stock market return. 
We find that the volume of cross-border M&A is positively related to the exchange rate 
differences and negatively related to the difference in stock market return. These results 
show that first there is currency effect – which means that Denmark has targeted those 
countries whose currencies have depreciated relative to Danish Krone. A significant and 
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negative relationship between stock market returns and the volume of cross-border deals 
means that on average the stock market performance of the Denmark is poorer compared to 
its targets.  
In column 2, we measure investor protection level. The coefficient of this variable is 
positive and significant at 10%. We can see that the coefficient of Log (GNP per capita) is 
positive and significant at 5%.  This result shows that on an average the targets come from 
countries with poor investor protection standards as well as economically poorer countries 
than Denmark. In column 5, currency, market return and investor protection continue to be 
significant. The variables, corporate tax, geographic distance and religion are not 
statistically significant and bilateral trade is significant and positive throughout. 
4.1.3 Finland 
 Over the sample period Finland has done 993 cross-border deals with 58 different 
countries. Figure 13 shows the volume of deals over the sample period and Figure 14 shows 
the distribution of these deals among the continents. Out of the 58 countries, we were able 
to use 56 countries in our specification as we are missing data for Georgia and Moldova 
which represent 1 deal each.  
Figure 13: Volume of Cross-border deals – Finnish acquirers 
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Figure 14: Cross-border deals distribution – Finnish Acquirers 
 
 
 Table 8 shows the correlations between the variables and Table 9 shows the 
mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values.  
Table 8: Correlations - Finland 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependent        
2 Currency 0.22        
3 Market Ret. 0.15 0.51       
4 IP 0.28 -0.04 0.30      
5 Tax 0.20 0.16 0.08 -0.01     
6 GD -
0.34 
0.22 0.10 -0.54 -0.27    
7 Religion 0.18 -0.06 -0.32 -0.18 -0.30 0.03   
8 Ln(GNP) 0.02 0.59 0.24 -0.03 0.10 0.13 -0.31  
9 Bilateral 
Trade 
0.71 0.21 0.06 0.26 0.10 -0.37 0.45 -0.18 
IP – Investor protection, GD – Geographic distance 
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Table 9: Mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum & Standard Deviation - Finland 
 Y Currency Market 
Ret. 
IP Tax GP Religion Ln(GNP) Bilateral 
Trade 
Mean 0.83 0.75 -22934.36 -0.03 -0.67 4683.10 0.23 1.05 0.96 
Median 0.27 0.90 500.02 0.02 -0.82 2369.36 0.00 0.95 0.50 
Maximum 7.14 1.42 1256.10 0.38 14.44 17069.93 1.00 3.87 10.15 
Minimum 0.02 -0.73 -954484.40 -0.54 -30.00 99.21 0.00 -0.77 0.02 
Std. Dev 1.42 0.58 142213.10 0.25 8.03 4466.54 0.43 1.10 1.64 
          
Obs 56.00 51.00 45.00 47.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 
Y – Dependent variable, IP – Investor protection 
 To analyze the pattern and determinants of the cross-border M&A between Finland 
and its target we run a least square methods test on the cross-sectional data. Our dependent 
variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is Finland as a 
percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the 
target. Table 10 contains the estimate of our regression. Bilateral trade and Log (GNP per 
capita) are our control variables. 
 The results of this country are very different from Denmark. As you can see in 
Table 10 the only variables that are statistically significant are Log (GNP per capita) – in 
columns 2, 3 & 4, Market Return in column 5 and Bilateral trade throughout the test. The 
interesting part in the results is that the coefficient of market return is positive and 
significant at 10%. Which is opposite from what we saw in Denmark, it represents that on 
an average the targets have worse performing stock markets as compared to their acquirer, 
Finland. Bilateral trade is again significant at 1% showing that it is an important factor for 
volume of cross-border M&A for Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Table 10: Cross-sectional data results – Finland 
This table presents the results of five least squares method regressions for 56 countries with Finland as the 
acquiring country. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is 
Finland as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the target. The 
independent variable are the difference between Finland and target country’s – exchange rates, stock market 
returns, anti-self-dealing index – proxy for investor protection, corporate tax and geographical distance 
between the capital cities. We include logarithm of GNP per capital and bilateral trade, measured as total 
number imports from Finland by the target country as a percent of total trade (imports & exports)  by the 
target, as control variables. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if Finland and the target 
country share the same religion. The errors shown in the parentheses are adjusted for hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Currency 0.0318    -0.1562 
 (0.1298)    (0.1903) 
Market Return 0.0002    0.0093* 
 (0.0001)    (0.0057) 
Investor Protection  0.4421   0.1971 
  (0.2818)   (0.3206) 
Tax   0.0086  0.014 
   (0.0136)  (0.0163) 
Geographic Distance    0.0271 -0.0033 
    (0.0443) (0.0166) 
Religion    0.6036 -0.1052 
    (0.6839) (0.2688) 
Log (GNP per 
capita) 
0.0944 0.1689** 0.2843* 0.2947** 0.1487 
 (0.0943) (0.0718) (0.1487) (0.1435) (0.1145) 
Bilateral Trade 0.4981*** 0.7229*** 0.5009*** 0.4594*** 0.7140*** 
 (0.0753) (0.1354) (0.1116) (0.1575) (0.2239) 
Constant 0.0651 -0.1276 0.0562 -0.1877 0.0553 
 (0.0744) (0.106) (0.0872) (0.2814) (0.0926) 
      
R
2
 0.6 0.62 0.37 0.41 0.55 
N Observations 45 47 56 56 41 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.1.4 Norway 
 Over the sample period Norway has done 712 cross-border deals with 53 different 
countries. Figure 15 shows the volume of deals over the sample period and Figure 16 shows 
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the distribution of these deals among the continents. Out of the 53 countries, we are missing 
data for 6 countries
17
, which leaves us with 47 observations for the dependent variable.  
Figure 15: Volume of Cross-border deals – Norwegian acquirers 
 
 
Figure 16: Cross-border deals distribution – Norwegian acquirers 
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 Albania, Armenia, Bahamas, Montenegro, Nicaragua, and Tanzania which represent 1 deal each. 
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 Table 11 shows the correlations between the variables and Table 12 shows the 
mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values.  
Table 11: Correlations - Norway 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependent        
2 Currency 0.22        
3 Market Ret. 0.08 0.54       
4 IP 0.16 0.05 0.35      
5 Tax 0.11 0.16 0.07 -0.002     
6 GD -0.26 0.38 0.18 -0.46 -0.28    
7 Religion 0.51 -0.25 -0.34 -0.07 -0.22 -0.29   
8 Ln(GNP) -0.21 0.67 0.32 -0.03 0.12 0.33 -0.41  
9 Bilateral 
Trade 
0.77 -0.19 -0.35 0.03 -0.02 -0.43 0.72 -0.45 
IP – Investor protection, GD – Geographic distance 
 
Table 12: Mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum & Standard Deviation - Norway 
 Y Currency Market 
Ret. 
IP Tax GP Religion Ln(GNP) Bilateral 
Trade 
Mean 0.53 -0.53 -25680.40 -0.05 2.89 4174.22 0.21 1.78 1.17 
Median 0.19 -0.49 -158.49 -0.02 2.61 2004.52 0.00 1.56 0.38 
Maximum 5.41 0.22 614.43 0.34 17.33 15973.39 1.00 9.87 10.90 
Minimum 0.02 -1.60 -955131.50 -0.58 -
27.11 
415.33 0.00 0.18 0.05 
Std. Dev 1.02 0.58 148979.30 0.23 8.54 4014.40 0.41 1.59 2.11 
          
Obs 47 43 41 40 47 47 47 47 47 
Y – Dependent variable, IP – Investor protection 
To analyze the pattern and determinants of the cross-border M&A between Norway 
and its target we run a least square methods test on the cross-sectional data. Our dependent 
variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is Norway as a 
percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the 
target. Table 13 contains the estimate of our regression. Bilateral trade and Log (GNP per 
capita) are our control variables. 
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Table 13: Cross-sectional data results – Norway 
This table presents the results of five least squares method regressions for 47 countries with Norway as the 
acquiring country. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where the acquiring country is 
Norway as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the target The 
independent variable are the difference between Norway and target country’s – exchange rates, stock market 
returns, anti-self-dealing index – proxy for investor protection, corporate tax and geographical distance 
between the capital cities. We include logarithm of GNP per capital and bilateral trade, measured as total 
number imports from Norway by the target country as a percent of total trade (imports & exports)  by the 
target, as control variables. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if Norway and the target 
country share the same religion. The errors shown in the parentheses are adjusted for hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Currency 0.5083***    0.4036** 
 (0.1528)    (0.1594) 
Market Return -0.00006    0.0213*** 
 (0.00007)    (0.0048) 
Investor Protection  0.463   0.2042 
  (0.2841)   (0.1796) 
Tax   -0.007  0.0121 
   (0.0088)  (0.0089) 
Geographic Distance    -0.0182 0.0091 
    (0.0209) (0.0109) 
Religion    0.6140** 0.1342 
    (0.2344) (0.2597) 
Log (GNP per 
capita) 
-0.1007 0.0792 0.4189*** 0.4316*** -0.087 
 (0.072) (0.0847) (0.1441) (0.1361) (0.0531) 
Bilateral Trade 0.3356*** 0.1988* 0.2655** 0.1811 0.3656*** 
 (0.0481) (0.1125) (0.1141) (0.1185) (0.041) 
Constant 0.4554** 0.0815 -0.5013* -0.5002* 0.2927 
 (0.2029) (0.1817) (0.2496) (0.2599) (0.1955) 
      
R
2
 0.71 0.33 0.49 0.53 0.8 
N Observations 41 40 47 47 37 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In column 1, you can see that the coefficient of difference in exchange rates 
between Norway and its target is positive and significant at 1%. It implies that that on an 
average Norway targets the countries whose currencies have depreciated against Norwegian 
Korne. This result is similar to that of Denmark. In column 4, we can see that religion is 
positive and significant 5% while bilateral trade isn’t. This shows that on an average 
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Norway has undertaken significant volume of deals with countries sharing the same 
religion. But when all the variables are included in regression 5 religion is no more 
significant. In column 5, currency continues to be positive and significant. Market return 
has a positive relationship with the volume of cross-border M&A and is significant at 1 %. 
This result is similar to that of Finland’s and implies that comparatively Norway’s targets 
on an average are from countries with poor stock market performance. Bilateral trade 
continues to play an important role in Norway as well.   
4.1.5 Sweden 
Over the sample period Sweden has done 1993 cross-border deals with 71 different 
countries. Figure 17 shows the volume of deals over the sample period and Figure 18 shows 
the distribution of these deals among the continents. Out of the 71 countries, we are missing 
data 8 countries
18
, which leaves us with 63 observations for the dependent variable.  
Figure 17: Volume of Cross-border deals – Swedish acquirers 
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 Bosnia & Herzegovina representing 3 deals, Cayman Islands, Congo, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Vanuatu – 
representing 1 deal each, and Gibraltar and Tanzania which represents 2 deals. 
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Figure 18: Cross-border deals distribution – Swedish acquirers 
 
 Table 14 shows the correlations between the variables and Table 15 shows the 
mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values.  
 
Table 14: Correlations - Sweden 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependent        
2 Currency 0.12        
3 Market 
Ret. 
0.07 0.48       
4 IP 0.20 -0.11 0.30      
5 Tax 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.004     
6 GD -0.34 0.35 0.13 -0.56 -0.28    
7 Religion 0.44 -0.17 -0.33 -0.21 -0.29 -0.01   
8 Ln(GNP) -0.27 0.65 0.25 -0.04 0.10 0.25 -0.31  
9 Bilateral 
Trade 
0.88 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.01 -0.33 0.58 -0.32 
IP – Investor protection, GD – Geographic distance 
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Table 15: Mean, Median, Maximum, Minimum & Standard Deviation - Sweden 
 Y Currency Market 
Ret. 
IP Tax GP Religion Ln(GNP) Bilateral 
Trade 
Mean 1.15 -0.54 -21096.93 -0.15 0.59 4501.53 0.17 1.18 1.73 
Median 0.54 -0.48 -14.98 -0.11 0.86 2410.59 0.00 1.08 0.91 
Maximum 7.78 0.20 752.27 0.26 15.36 17445.63 1.00 3.88 14.17 
Minimum 0.05 -1.97 -954993.70 -0.67 -29.09 0.48 -0.20 -0.65 0.13 
Std. Dev 1.65 0.61 134949.90 0.24 8.00 4323.79 0.38 1.08 2.79 
          
Obs 63 52 50 55 61 63 63 61 62 
Y – Dependent variable, IP – Investor protection 
 To analyze the pattern and determinants of the cross-border M&A between Sweden 
and its target we run a least square methods test on the cross-sectional data. Our dependent 
variable is the number of cross-border deals where acquiring country is Sweden as a 
percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the 
target. Table 16 contains the estimate of our regression. Bilateral trade and Log (GNP per 
capita) are our control variables. 
 In column 1, we can see that there is a negative and significant relationship between 
difference in stock market return and volume of cross-border deals. This shows that ton an 
average the targets are from countries whose stock market performance is better compared 
to Sweden’s stock market performance. This is result is similar to that of Denmark. In 
column 2, the coefficient of investor protection is positive and significant at 10%, which 
implies that Sweden targets the countries with poor investor protection standards and again 
similar to that of Denmark’s result. In column 4, the coefficient of religion is negative and 
significant. Which means that on an average Sweden has undertaken more deals with 
countries with it does not share a similar religion, which exactly opposite to Norway’s 
cross-border M&A activity.  
In column 5, where we include all the variables, Market return and religion are no longer 
significant, but the coefficient of currency is positive and significant. It shows that on an 
average Sweden has acquired firms in countries whose currencies have depreciated against 
Swedish Krone. As with Denmark, Finland and Norway, bilateral trade continues to be 
positive and significant highlighting its importance. 
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Table 16: Cross-sectional data results – Sweden 
This table presents the results of five least squares method regressions for 63 countries with Sweden as the 
acquiring country. The dependent variable is the number of cross-border deals where acquiring country is 
Sweden as a percentage of the total number of deals (domestic and cross-border) undertaken by the target. 
The independent variable are the difference between Sweden and target country’s – exchange rates, stock 
market returns, anti-self-dealing index – proxy for investor protection, corporate tax and geographical 
distance between the capital cities. We include logarithm of GNP per capital and bilateral trade, measured as 
total number imports from Sweden by the target country as a percent of total trade (imports & exports)  by the 
target, as control variables. We also include a dummy variable that equals one if Sweden and the target 
country share the same religion. The errors shown in the parentheses are adjusted for hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Currency -0.4433    0.7300* 
 (0.8473)    (0.4223) 
Market Return -0.0012***    -0.0154 
 (0.0004)    (0.0121) 
Investor Protection  0.7518*   0.6473* 
  (0.4231)   (0.3403) 
Tax   -0.0105  0.0120 
   (0.0206)  (0.0174) 
Geographic Distance    -0.0342 -0.0151 
    (0.0320) (0.0187) 
Religion    -0.7409** -0.1508 
    (0.3388) (0.1825) 
Log (GNP per 
capita) 
0.2566 0.0682 0.2006 0.1087 -0.2305 
 (0.4094) (0.0947) (0.1242) (0.1312) (0.1495) 
Bilateral Trade 0.4577*** 0.4319*** 0.4326*** 0.4628*** 0.4342*** 
 (0.1082) (0.0778) (0.0843) (0.0763) (0.0715) 
Constant -0.2779 0.3147 0.1196 0.4834** 0.9536* 
 (0.8544) (0.2191) (0.1376) (0.2421) (0.5274) 
      
R
2
 0.55 0.67 0.49 0.49 0.82 
N Observations 48 53 59 61 43 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
 We will now discuss what these results imply for Nordic acquirers as a whole and 
also as individual countries.  
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From the results that we have seen earlier it is clear that there is valuation effect. 
Currency is positive and significant and it represents that over the sample period the 
acquirer had a strong currency compared to target countries. It implies that the Nordic 
acquirers had acquired the firms in those countries whose currency has depreciated relative 
to theirs. Our results are consistent with Erel et al., (2012) who show that “short-term 
movements in two countries’ currencies increase the likelihood that firms in the country 
with appreciating currency purchase firms in the country with the depreciating currency”. 
This can be explained by the fact that when a foreign currency depreciates relative to home 
country it makes the foreign assets cheaper to obtain. Uddin and Boateng (2011) found 
results supporting this notion. When we look at the individual countries and Currency is 
significant for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It shows that, outbound cross-border deals 
from these countries can be explained by the differences in the exchange rates of the 
acquiring and target countries.  
Market return, for Nordic acquirers, has an inverse relationship with the volume of 
cross border deals implying that on an average the Nordics have targeted those firms whose 
country’s stock market performance is booming relative to theirs. This is quite opposite to 
Erel et la., (2012) results who found a positive relationship and stated the when there is 
great difference in market performance the acquirer is from the country with better 
performing country. But when we take a look at individual countries Finland and Norway’s 
results are consistent with Erel et al., (2012) results while Denmark and Sweden’s are not. 
Overall Denmark and Sweden’s results have affected the Nordic acquirers’ outcome. A 
possible explanation can be that a very high difference between the acquirer and target 
country market performance may make the acquiring firm feel uneasy, as it would be too 
risky to buy a firm in a market that is perhaps sharply declining in relatively. Having a 
positive difference between market performance makes it attractive but when the difference 
becomes too big, acquirers get scared.  
 Investor protection is positive and highly significant as expected. This shows that 
the Nordic acquirers offer better investor protection than their targets. These results are 
consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) who state that investor protection plays an 
important role in determining the direction of cross-border deals and that typically acquirers 
are from countries with strong investor protection countries than the targets. And as Coffee 
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(1999) stated cross-border M&A activity is an important tool for effective world 
convergence of corporate governance standards. A look the individual study reveals that 
Investor protection is significant in Denmark and Sweden’s case and not in Finland and 
Norway’s case. 
 Tax is not significant which implies that it does have any effect on the propensity of 
cross-border deals. We expected to see a negative relationship between geographic distance 
and the volume of cross-border deals but we see no such results, as it not statistically 
significant. Which implies - geographic distance between the Nordic acquirers and their 
target countries does not affect their decision to undertake a cross-border deal. A possible 
reason can be that the Nordic countries are far up in the north and in general further away 
from rest of the world. 
 Bilateral trade is positive and significant throughout the regression showing that it 
plays a very important role in determining the direction of the cross-border deals. It means 
that the Nordic Acquirers are more inclined in conducting cross-border deals with the 
countries they trade with. These results are consistent to that of Rossi and Volpin (2004). 
This can also be the reason why geographic proximity doesn’t matter.  
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5. Conclusions, Limitations & Future Research 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Cross-border M&As continue to increase world-wide. About one-third of the 
worldwide M&A includes deals between firms from two different countries. With 
globalization, the world economies becoming more and more integrated cross-border 
M&As are becoming more wide spread. This growth calls for better understanding of the 
workings of these cross-border deals. The current literature is mostly focused on all the 
countries in general or mainly UK and US. There are very few studies exploring country 
wise analysis.  
Based on this we have selected the Nordic outbound cross-border M&A deals for research. 
To the best of our knowledge there are no studies exploring the determinants of cross-
border deals in this region. The sample period, 2003 – 2012, shows that the Nordic region 
(excluding the Nordic countries) has done deals with 95 different countries. But due to non-
availability of data we were able to use only 77 countries for our analysis, majority of 
which belonged to Europe. The results of our analysis provided several insights. 
 First, when we take the Nordic acquirers as a whole, several variables affect the 
pattern and volume of the outbound deals. Currency and investor protection has a positive 
impact, which implies that comparatively targets are from countries whose currency has 
depreciated over the sample period and with poor investor protection standards. Market 
return is negative and suggests that the targets are from better performing countries. 
Bilateral trade is significant throughout showing that it a key driver for Nordic acquirers.  
 Second, when you look at individual country results there are mixed results. 
Currency plays a role in explaining the volume of deals in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
but not in Finland. Market return presents mixed results. In Denmark and Sweden it has a 
negative effect implying the targets are from countries with better performing stock  
markets, while in Finland and Norway it has positive effect implying that comparatively the 
acquirers are stock markets is booming. Investor protection is only a determinant for 
Denmark and Sweden and not Finland and Norway. Bilateral trade is significant in all 
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countries highlighting its importance as a potential reason for the volume and pattern of 
outbound cross border deals.   
In conclusion I would like to say that it is very interesting to study the behaviour of 
the Nordic acquirers. Even though they are neighboring countries they present different 
factors governing their M&A deals individually. Overall bilateral trade plays a key role in 
the pattern of their acquisitions, showing that a strong trade relation promotes the volume 
of cross-border activity for the Nordics. Currency, Market return and investor protection are 
also determining factors but their importance varies across individual countries.  
5.2 Limitations & future research 
 A significant limitation of this study is that we do not take into consideration the 
industry level and deal level variables of the deal. This research is more of an overview of 
the Nordic acquirers and not an in-depth analysis of the drivers. The industry level and deal 
level may be able to better explain the conflicting results among the four countries. This 
creates an opportunity for future researches.  
 The conflicting results among the Nordic countries, which are geographically and 
culturally closer and have similar economic conditions   shows that not all countries present 
the same determining factors. A study of other countries would be interesting in this 
context and maybe the results can be used to explain why deals with certain countries fail 
while deals with others don’t.  
 Studies exploring the determinants and reasons for cross-border acquisitions are 
limited and those especially exploring a particular region or country. Hopefully, this work 
would be a stepping stone for more future research into country wise analysis of the cross-
border deals. Understanding how cross-border M&As works and what factors trigger a deal 
would not only be helpful for academic research but also for professionals to take informed 
decisions which can affect the success or failure of the deal. 
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